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Mahoney v. RFE/RL: An Unexpected
Direction for the Foreign Laws Defense
ABSTRACT

A law is only as good, or as powerful, as its exceptions
allow it to be. Unless carefully drawn, an exception intended
to avoid unjust or impractical applications of a rule can
consume the rule itself In the case of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act and Title VII, which were amended to
apply to U.S. citizens working abroad, the :foreign laws
defense," as interpreted in Mahoney v. RFE/RL, threatens to
defeat the application of the general rule prohibiting
discrimination. This Note briefly traces the history of the
extraterritorialapplication of U.S. law and the interests that
were served by the judge-created presumption against
extraterritorialityand the foreign compulsion defense. This
Note then analyzes the Mahoney decision against that
backdrop and questions whether the legal standard it
establishes accommodates those competing concerns.
Finding that it does not, this Note suggests that the
institutionalframework of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the State Department could be used to
evaluate claims for their merit and potentialfor controversy,
and thus relieve the courts of the traditionally uncomfortable
role of makingforeignpolicy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ordinarily, international custom is the primary source of
international law.' In the realm of extraterritorial employment
law, however, there is no body of customary international law
because only the United States extends its employment laws to
govern its nationals working abroad. 2 Without custom as a
guideline, U.S. courts have been forced to develop this body of
law on their own. In Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc.,3 the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals was faced with the task of defining the
extraterritorial scope of Title V114 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA)5 by interpreting the foreign laws

1.
Rights Act
2.
3.
4.
5.

Helen M. Hibbing, ExtraterritorialApplication of Title VI of the Civil
84 AM. SOcY'. INT'L L. PRoc. 415, 418 (1990).
Id.
47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S.Ct. 181 (1995).
42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1967).
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exception to those statutes. 6 The foreign laws defense provides
that U.S. companies hiring U.S. citizens abroad are not required
to comply with the ADEA and Title VII where compliance with
them "would cause such employer, or a corporation controlled by
such employer, to violate the laws of the country in which such
workplace is located." 7 Mahoney is the first decision to set
standards for the foreign laws exception, and its interpretation
unnecessarily
limits
protection
against
employment
discrimination for U.S. citizens working abroad.
With an
increasing number of U.S. citizens working outside the country,8
the increase in international trade and work, and the strong
national interest in eliminating discrimination in the workplace,
any unnecessary limitation on the protection against employment
discrimination undermines a significant national interest in
promoting fair employment practices.
For those inclined to balance interests, the international
labor arena presents a dizzying array of conflicting motivations:
the interest in eliminating employment discrimination against
U.S. citizens, the legitimate desire of foreign states to regulate
their domestic workplaces, the potential for international
disputes stemming from jurisdictional or cultural overreaching by
the United States, the rational impulse of U.S. companies to avoid
being caught in conflicting social and legal regimes, and the
reluctance of U.S. courts to become involved in international
policy making. This Note argues that the Mahoney court has not
balanced the interests in this field so much as it has avoided
making decisions affecting foreign policy, a role that courts have
strived to avoid. As a consequence, the rule promulgated in
Mahoney limits the protection of U.S. law even when there is no
significant threat to international comity or foreign relations,
which are the most important factors in the balancing of
competing interests.
Section II briefly traces the history of the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law and the circumstances that led Congress
to apply the ADEA and Title VII to U.S. citizens abroad. Section
III surveys the policies served by the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the foreign compulsion defense, and the

construction of other defenses to the ADEA and Title VII. This
analysis reveals the strongest interests in the equation, those
6.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1967). Although the terms "foreign laws defense"
and "foreign laws exception" are used interchangeably, the terms imply different
purposes. The notion that the provision is a "defense" suggests that its purpose is
to protect U.S. corporations abroad, while the term "exception" places the
emphasis on avoiding international conflict.
7.
Id.
8.
Lairold M. Street, Extratenitoriality: Conflict of Laws, NATL B. ASS'N
MAG.. July/Aug. 1995. at 16.
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that should be served by an interpretation of the foreign laws
defense. Section IV considers the district court and court of
appeals decisions in Mahoney, and Section V attempts to classify
the facts of Mahoney to determine which interests were really at
stake in that case. Section VI surveys several legal standards
that could be used to determine when to limit the extraterritorial
application of law, and concludes that the foreign compulsion

defense, rather than the standard created in Mahoney, better
addresses the interests involved. Finally, the Note concludes by
suggesting one-way in which these statutes might be amended to
allow each branch of the government to make decisions that are
better tailored to their respective roles.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EXTRATERRITORIAuTy
For two centuries, the U.S. Congress, U.S. courts, and
commentators have struggled to determine under which
circumstances to extend the reach of U.S. law beyond our
national borders. Initially, the question was easily resolved by
the Supreme Court's strict adherence to a jurisdiction limited by
territoriality-the traditional notion that the law of a country
cannot extend beyond its territorial boundaries. 9 Under such a
scheme, Congress, whatever its intent, simply lacked the power
to affect the employment relations of U.S. citizens working
abroad. In Blackmer v. United States, the Supreme Court
abandoned its strict adherence to terTitoriality and recognized
that the nationality of an actor can serve as a valid basis for
jurisdiction over disputes involving that actor.10 In certain
circumstances, the law of the actor's country may appropriately
follow the actor abroad and serve as the legal standard to
adjudicate disputes involving that party which occur overseas."'

9.
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909)
(holding that "the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act

as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done."), overnuled by Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S.
690 (1962).
10.
284 U.S. 421 (1932).

While it appears that the petitioner removed his residence to France
in the year 1924, it Is undisputed that he was, and continued to be, a
citizen of the United States.... By virtue of the obligations of citizenship,

the United States retained its authority over him, and he was bound by its
laws made applicable to him in a foreign country. Thus, although resident
abroad, the petitioner remained subject to the taxing power of the United

States.
Id. at 436.
11.
Id.
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Today, international law recognizes that nations may permissibly
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over disputes in which the
state has an interest, so long as each state recognizes the duty
not to interfere with the sovereignty and jurisdiction of other
12
states.
Once the court determined that Congress had the power to
make laws applying beyond the United States national
boundaries, the question became one of statutory interpretation
as to whether Congress had chosen to exercise its power to
legislate extraterritorially in a particular statute. In keeping with
its traditional stance, as expressed in American Banana, the
against
"presumption
so-called
the
crafted
Court

extraterritoriality" to apply U.S. law abroad and to respect the
sovereignty of other countries. Under this doctrine, the court
required a clear statement of congressional intent to apply a
statute extraterritorially before wandering into "a delicate field of
13
international relations."
U.S. courts used the presumption against extraterritoriality
in refusing to apply the ADEA and Title VII to U.S. citizens
working abroad. In Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc.,14 a U.S.
plaintiff filed an action with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) after being fired by a U.S. corporation
operating in England.' 5 The court dismissed the suit for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that the ADEA did not evidence the requisite
16
intent to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Specifically, the court found that the absence of an "alien
exemption" provision, as well as the absence of institutional
apparatus for its enforcement outside the United States,
suggested that Congress did not intend to apply the ADEA
abroad.' 7 Congress responded to this decision by amending the
ADEA to apply extraterritorially. 18 At the time, it was commonly

Gary Z. Nothstein & Jeffrey P. Ayres, The MultinationalCorporationand
12.
the ExtraterritorialApplication of the Labor Management Relations Act, 10 CORNELL
INT'LL. J. 1, 13 (1976).
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
13.
555 F. Supp. 1251 (D.N.J. 1983). affd, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
14.
Id. at 1254.
15.
Id. at 1259.
16.
Id. at 1257-60.
17.
The statutory definition of "employee" was amended to include "any
18.
individual who is a citizen of the United States employed by an employer in a
foreign country," and stated that "the provisions of this section shall not apply
where the employer is a foreign person not controlled by an U.S. employer." This
ensured that the act would only apply to U.S. corporations. Older Americans Act
Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(a), 98 Stat. 1767, 1792 (1984).
At the time it was passed, the amendment applying the ADEA extraterritorially
was considered to be one of "two minor changes" to the statute. S. REP. No. 98467, at 2 (1984). reprintedin 1984 U.SC.C.A.N. 2974. 2975.
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thought that, unlike the ADEA, Title VII was intended to apply
extraterritorially. 19
Nonetheless, in Boureslan v. Arabian
American Oil Co.,20 the Supreme Court held that Congress had
not expressed the requisite intent to overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality. 2 t In its opinion, the Court invited
Congress to amend Title VII to clearly state its intent to enforce it
22
abroad.
23
In 1991, Congress accepted the Court's invitation.
However, Congress limited the jurisdictional scope of Title VII,
like the ADEA, to U.S. workers working for U.S. companies, and
not to foreign nationals hired by U.S. corporations, or U.S.
citizens hired by foreign companies. 2 4
To further restrict
extraterritorial application, Congress inserted the "foreign laws
exception" into both provisions. 25
While
courts and
commentators have differed on the proper role of the "foreign
laws" defense in extraterritorial discrimination actions, it is clear
that the protection of the ADEA and Title VII can only extend as
far as the defense will allow them.

III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IMPLICATED BY THE FOREIGN LAWS
DEFENSE

A. The PresumptionAgainst Extraterritoriality
"The history of the extraterritorial application of U.S. labor
standards, as applied to overseas U.S. citizens, is the history of a
canon of interpretation known as the presumption against

19.
20.
based its
Title VII's
21.
22.

Otherwise, Title VII too would have been amended.
Boureslan v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). The court
decision on a lengthy and technical discussion of the implications of
"alien exemption" clause. Id. at 253-57.
Id. at 259.
Id.

23.

Congress amended Title VII with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, applying

Title VII extraterritorially. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66. §
109(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e1(b)-(c)).

24.

Congress assumed that few disputes would arise by applying these

laws only to U.S. citizens working for U.S. companies. The presumption against
extraterritoriality allowed courts "to avoid, if possible, the separation-of-powers
and international-comity questions associated with construing a statute to
displace the domestic law of another nation." Boureslan, 499 U.S. at 265. In
contrast "[nlothing nearly so dramatic Is at stake when Congress merely seeks to
regulate the conduct of United States nationalsabroad." Id. (emphasis added).

25.
If the "mere regulation" of U.S. citizens and corporations abroad were
as non-controversial as the Boureslan Court suggested, the foreign laws exception
would have been unnecessary.

19971

DISCRIMINATION AND THE FOREIGNLAWS DEFENSE

extraterritoriality." 26

against

385

The primary objective of the presumption

extraterritoriality

was

to

respect

principles

of

international comity and to remove the judiciary from delicate
international disputes that could be the source of discord. 2 7 In
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,28 the Supreme Court
announced a rule of judicial construction that U.S. legislation
"ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains." 29 The Court's reluctance to
interfere in the internal legal affairs of foreign nations is reflected
in its statement that the U.S. government would intervene on
behalf of a U.S. citizen abroad if that citizen were oppressed
without having violated any foreign domestic law.30 If the U.S.
citizen were oppressed by the operation of another nation's laws
while in that country, any court relying on Schooner Charming
31
Betsy would not intervene on behalf of the U.S. citizen.
The presumption against extraterritoriality was designed not
just to avoid foreign policy disputes, but to ensure that courts did
not overstep their bounds and intrude upon the realm of the
legislative and executive branches in making and implementing
foreign policy.32
Courts typically invoked the presumption
against extraterritoriality to avoid interfering in the "delicate field
of international relations," 33 and to avoid judicial constructions
that could raise "foreign policy implications" 34 with the

26. JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, EXTRATERRITORIAL EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE REGULATION OFTHE OVERSEAS WORKPLACE 111 (1992).
27.
Derek G. Barella. Checking the "'rigger-Happy" Congress: The
ExtraterritorialExtension of Federal Employment Laws Requires Prudence. 69 IND.
L.J. 889, 893 (1994). See also ZIMMERMAN, supranote 26, at 113.
28.
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
29.
Id. at 118.
30.
Id. at 120.
31.
Id.
32.
"[I]t is the court's province and duty to say what the law is, although
this responsibility does not traditionally extend to directing the United States as to
how to proceed on the international stage." Footwear Distrib. and Retailers v.
United States, 852 F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994). The court also
noted that while "[the conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative. .. Departments,"
not every foreign controversy is necessarily beyond judicial decisionmaking. Id.
(quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964)).
33.
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
34.
Boureslan v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 264 (1991) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Although foreign policy concerns are not completely beyond the
scope of judicial decisionmaking, "courts should be reluctant to review these
matters because 'resolution of such issues frequently turn[s] on standards that..
. involve the exercise of discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or the
legislature.'" FootwearDistrib. and Retailers, 852 F. Supp. at 1096 (quoting Roger
P. Alford, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Laws: The United States and
European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L. L 1, 12-13 (1992)).
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"possibilities of international discord.. and retaliative action."3 5
Likewise, commentators generally agree that the presumption
was designed to promote international comity3 6 and to avoid

37
judicial involvement in potential international conflicts.
This is not to say that U.S. courts were unaware of the
hardship on U.S. parties caught between competing sovereigns.
Some courts have cited the interests of U.S. businesses as being
important to the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of law. In deciding not to apply the ADEA abroad,
Judge Posner observed that "the fear of outright collisions
between domestic and foreign law--collisions both hard on the
people caught in the cross-fire and a potential source of friction
between the United States and foreign countries-lies behind the
presumption." 38 Despite Judge Posner's attention to the fate of
unwary defendants, his opinion in Pfeiffer was anomalous. Many
decisions not to apply a law extraterritorially were driven by "the
hesitancy exhibited by the courts when considering the
transnational application of federal employment statutes."3 9 The
protection of U.S. corporations, deriving from such judicial
abstinence, was a side effect rather than a primary motivation
behind the presumption.
Since the Supreme Court has "presume[d] that Congress
legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against

extraterritoriality," the statutory foreign laws defense should be
informed by the policy concerns behind the presumption against
extraterritoriality. 40
Because the presumption against
extraterritoriality was designed not to protect U.S. corporations,
but primarily to avoid diplomatic clashes and the courts'
involvement in such conflicts, it is sensible to interpret the
foreign laws defense to accomplish the same objectives.
Similarly, considerations that were incidental to the presumption
against extraterritoriality should not be given much weight in
construing the foreign laws defense. The existence of potential
hardships placed on U.S. employers abroad, though not

35.
Benz, 353 U.S. at 147.
36.
Comity traditionally has two meanings. The first Is what might be
called "prescriptive comity," which refers to "the respect sovereign nations afford
each other by limiting the reach of their laws." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
113 S.Ct. 2891. 2920 (1993). The presumption against extraterritoriality Is
essentially an expression of such respect. In the absence of specific Intent
regarding extraterritorial application, courts will assume that Congress did not
intend to intrude upon the jurisdiction of other nations. There Is another related
concept referred to as the "comity of courts," under which judges "decline to
exercise jurisdiction over matters more appropriately adjudged elsewhere." Id.
37.
See Barella, supranote 27, at 891-99.
38.
Pfeiffer v. William Wrigley Co., 755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1985).
39. - Barella, supra note 27, at 901.
40.
ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 264.
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completely immaterial, was nbt a deciding factor in constructing
the presumption against extraterritoriality and should not be
given too much weight in interpreting the "foreign laws"
41
provisions of the ADEA and Title VII.
B. CongressionalIntent in Applying the ADEA and Title VII

Extraterritorially
In extending the ADEA and Title VII extraterritorially, it is
axiomatic that the congressional purpose was to protect as many
U.S. citizens as possible from discrimination in the workplace,
whether or not that workplace was in the territorial boundaries of
the United States. 42 Given the millions of U.S. citizens living
abroad, and the large volume of international trade
and
transnational employment, Congress doubtless has a significant
interest in protecting those U.S. citizens from invidious
discrimination. 43 One must also consider the circumstances
under which Congress decided to extend the application of the
ADEA and Title VII. The amendments were designed to overrule
the decisions in ARAMCO and Wrigley, which unreasonably
limited the protection afforded to employees of U.S. companies
abroad according to some members of Congress. 44 In light of
such circumstances, Congress would not have closed the "major

41.
This interpretation differs from that of the court of appeals in Mahoney,
which stated that its construction "agrees with [the foreign laws defense's] evident
purpose-to avoid placing overseas employers in the impossible position of having
to conform to two inconsistent legal regimes." Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d
447, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 181 (1995).
42.
The goal of the amendment was to "insure that the citizens of the
United States who are employed in a foreign workplace by U.S. corporations or
their subsidiaries enjoy the protections of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act." S. Rep. No. 98-467, at 27 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 3000.
43.
Jonathan Turley, Transnational Discrimination and the Economics of
ExtraterritorialRegulation. 70 B.U. L. REV. 339, 389 n.289 (1990). Interestingly,
estimates of the numbers of U.S. citizens working abroad vary considerably, and
no one can say with any certainty how many U.S. citizens work for private U.S.
employers abroad. The difficulty in making these estimates stems partly from the
fact that U.S. citizens abroad appear not to file their federal income tax returns
with the same regularity as domestic taxpayers. Id.

44.

Age Discriminationand Overseas Americans, 1983: Hearings before the

Subcomm. on Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983) (statement of Senator Charles Grassley) [hereinafter
Hearings], reprinted in Rende S. Orleans, Note, Extraterritorial Employment
ProtectionAmendments of 1991: CongressProtects U.S. Citizens Who Work for U.S.
Companies Abroad, 16 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 147, 162 (1992). Specifically,
Senator Grassley complained that the courts had "opened up a major loophole
which... could seriously threaten the protection under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act" and that these decisions could leave U.S. workers "out in the
cold." Id.
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loophole"45 of extraterritorial non-application without intending
that the statutes be broadly applied abroad.
C. Interpretationof OtherDefenses to Anti-DiscrimtinationStatutes
In interpreting the foreign laws exception, it is important to
remember that the defenses were not enacted alone, but were an
exception to a larger congressional mandate intended to end
discrimination against U.S. employees abroad.
This policy
concerned a desire to eliminate the "headwinds" of employment
discrimination. 46 When construing defenses to the ADEA or Title
VII, exceptions to the statute should be read narrowly to achieve
the statute's remedial goals as fully as possible. 4 7 Similarly,
courts must avoid "interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims
of discrimination of a remedy, without clear Congressional
mandate."48 In the domestic context, once a prima facie case of
discrimination 49 has been proven against an employer, the
defenses available to that employer are narrowly construed. The
employer must show either that it did not discriminate on the
basis of race in an individual case, or that the discriminatory
effect of its hiring policies is driven by a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ).5 0 Any BFOQ raised as a defense must
relate directly to the employee's ability to perform the job in
question, and not to considerations such as "customer
preference." 5 ' In the domestic context. Congress was clearly not

45.
Id.
46.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). "[G]ood Intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or
testing mechanisms that operate as 'built in headwinds' for minority groups and
are unrelated to measuring job capability." Id.
47.
Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1992).
48.
County of Washington v. Gunther. 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981).
49.
See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
McDonnell-Douglas establishes a system of burden shifting in disparate treatment
discrimination cases. The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination
by showing that (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class. (2) the plaintiff
applied for ajob and was qualified, (3) the plaintiffs application was rejected, and
(4) the employer either continued the job search or hired someone not in the
protected class. If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, then the burden
shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Its
employment decision. Id.

50.

I.

Depending on the nature of the alleged discrimination, there are a

host of other possible defenses to a discrimination claim such as "reasonable
factor other than age," or where an employer has made "reasonable
accommodations" to a religious practice, or "authenticity" in the case of an ethnic
restaurant.
51.
Fernandez, 653 F.2d at 1276. See also Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways,
Inc., 442 F.2d 385. 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that "it would be totally
anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers to
determine whether sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, It was ...
these very
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concerned with the potential hardships to be borne by employers
in complying with the ADEA and Title VII, so long as those
difficulties did not arise from an employee's inability to perform
the job in question. Likewise, courts have generally rejected
employer attempts to use the cost of compliance as a defense to
Title VII in domestic actions. 52 It has also been held that foreign
private preference or widespread social discrimination does not
allow a U.S. corporation to deviate from Title VII or the ADEA.5 3
A customer's or client's "stereotypic impressions," whether
domestic or foreign, do not justify a U.S. employer to discriminate
when employing U.S. citizens abroad. 5 4 It seems unlikely that
foreign prejudices or the costs of compliance are significantly
greater in foreign countries, or that they represent hardships of a
different quantum for employers.5 5 Hence, in construing the
foreign laws exception to the ADEA and Title VII, courts should
seek to apply the statute as broadly as possible, limited only by
the unique restraints of international jurisdiction, comity, and
defenses that would work to defeat a domestic claim of
discrimination.
D. The ForeignCompulsion Defense as Applied to NonEmployment Cases
Prior to the Mahoney decision, it had been suggested, and
perhaps assumed, that the foreign laws exception of the ADEA
and Title VII was intended to be a codification of the judge-

prejudices that the Act was meant to overcome. Thus. we feel that customer
preference may be taken into account only when it is based on the company's
inability to perform the primary function or service it offers.").
52.
At least in cases where the cost is not so high as to threaten the
survival of the employer's business, "Itihe extra cost of employing members of one
sex . . . does not provide an affirmative Title VII defense for a discriminatory
refusal to hire members of that gender."
Automobile Workers v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991). Under the Reagan administration, the
EEOC considered, and rejected, the possibility of recognizing a cost defense to
Title VII litigation. Laura Oren, Protection, Patriarchy,and Capdtalisnm The Politics
and Theory of Gender-Speciftc Regulation in the Workplace, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L. J.
321, 363 n.236 (1996). It is worth noting that a "cost effectiveness" requirement
may simply be a way to reduce substantive protections without appearing to do
SO.

53.
See Fernandez, 653 F.2d at 1277. The court rejected an argument
that, due to societal discrimination,
gender could constitute a "bona fide
occupational qualification," which would operate as a defense to discriminatory
hiring practices. Although the court was not construing the foreign compulsion
defense, Fernandez supports the proposition that mere private pressures or
business concerns cannot command respect from U.S. courts. Id. at 1276-77.
54.
Id.
55.
For instance, consider the harassment and costs domestic employers
undoubtedly faced in racially integrating their workforce pursuant to Title VII
mandates
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created "foreign compulsion" defense.56 , The foreign compulsion

defense originally arose as a defense to the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law.5 7 It provides that "a state may

not require a person to do an act in another state that is
prohibited by the law of that state or by the law of the state of
which he is a national... .- 8 As stated in the landmark case,
Interamerican Refining Co. v. Texaco Maracaibo Co., "[wIere
compulsion not a defense, American firms abroad faced with a
government order would have to choose one country or the other
in which to do business."5 9 Considering the, focus on the fate of
the U.S. company abroad, it would appear that the defense is
designed to eliminate the hardships companies may suffer when
subject to a clash of laws. However, an analysis of case law and
commentary reveals that the real effect of the foreign compulsion
defense is to extend the reach of U.S. law as far as possible, while
avoiding international disputes caused by a serious conflict of
laws. Its principal aim is not to protect U.S. companies from
inconvenience or cost.
As was the case with the presumption against
extraterritoriality, one must distinguish between the desired
effects of the foreign compulsion defense and its incidental
effects.
There is a fundamental tension underlying the
Restatement's professed reasons for the foreign compulsion
defense and its standards for the application of the defense. On
the one hand, the Restatement states that the purpose of the
defense is to "protect persons caught between conflicting
commands." 60 The Restatement, however, allows the defense
"only when the other state's requirements are embodied in
binding laws or regulations subject to penal or other severe
sanction...."

61

In many cases, a defendant may be placed in a

seemingly intractable bind caused by the existence of foreign
expectations, cultural norms, or private agreements that clash
with U.S. law, but which do not rise to the level of formal
legislation or regulations. 6 2

56.

Informal compulsion, despite its

"Congress has incorporated the foreign compulsion defense Into the

provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991." Mark R. Azman, The Development of
Title VII Protectionfor American Citizens Employed Abroad by American Employers:
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 18 WM. MrrcHELL L. REV. 531. 546 (1992)
57.
Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc... 307 F. Supp.
1291, 1297-98 (D. Del. 1970).
58.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 441 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
59.
Interamerican Refining, 307 F. Supp. at 1298.
60.
RESTATEMENT. supranote 58, § 441 cmt. a.
61.
Id. §441 cmt. c.
62.
Win. Scott Smith, Extraterritorial Application of Title VII and the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Have Statute, Will Travel, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 191,
206-08 (1995).
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potentially harsh consequences, for U.S. defendants, has never
been sufficient to remove liability under U.S. law. 6 3 As a result,
some commentators have suggested that the Restatement's
requirement of a formal law or regulation defeats the essential

purpose of the foreign compulsion defense-fairness to the
defendant. 64

Nevertheless,

this argument assumes that the

purpose of the defense is to protect U.S. companies abroad. The
Restatement's and courts' reluctance to find private or informal
compulsion to be grounds for the foreign compulsion defense
does not suggest 'that the foreign compulsion defense fails in its
essential purpose to guarantee fairness to employers. Instead,
such reluctance suggests that the essential purpose of the foreign
compulsion defense is to avoid serious conflict of laws and
diplomatic disputes. The fact that U.S. corporations are saved
from the demands of seriously conflicting orders in some cases is
a beneficial consequence of the foreign compulsion defense, but
not the motivating factor behind the defense.
To ensure that the company is placed in a legally untenable
position (mandated by a foreign government) before allowing the
foreign compulsion defense, courts have repeatedly taken the
position that a foreign government's "knowledge, approval, or
even encouragement of the activity is not compulsion" sufficient
to relieve liability under the U.S. law.6 5 U.S. courts have been
willing to expose U.S. businesses to economic reprisals, the loss
of business, and even the risk of civil damages for compliance
with U.S. law.6 6 These cases tend to show that U.S. courts have
not flinched at the prospect of putting U.S. companies in a
difficult situation by forcing them to comply with U.S. law, so long
as the pressures applied to the U.S. company are private or
social, and not mandated by a foreign government.

63.

Id.

64.
See Michael A. Warner Jr., Comment, Strangers in a Strange Land:
Foreign Compulsion and the ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Employment
Law. 11 NW. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 371, 379-84 (1990). Warner argues that the other
frequently asserted justifications for the foreign compulsion defense-the act of
state doctrine (courts of the United States will accept the judgments of foreign
courts) and international comity-do not adequately explain the foreign
compulsion defense. Id. Thus fairness to the defendant is the principal
motivation for the defense. Id. at 379, 382. To advance the goal of fairness, U.S.
courts should acknowledge informal foreign compulsion.
65.
Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
1291, 1296-99 (D. Del. 1970); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d
897, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting also that the executive branch, which
prosecuted the action, could stop the suit of its own accord if it feared it would
result In diplomatic difficulties).
66.
InteramericanRefining. 307 F. Supp. at 1296-99; FirstNat'l City Bank,
396 F.2d at 904-05.
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There are circumstances under which even the existence of a
binding foreign statute is not sufficient to serve as a basis for the
defense. 6 7 In some cases, foreign governments, taking advantage
of the foreign laws defense, have enacted "blocking statutes" to
prevent U.S. companies from supplying information in U.S.

lawsuits.68 When faced with such a statute, U.S. courts have
undertaken a "comity analysis" to determine which state has the
most powerful interest in exercising jurisdiction, and whether the
exercise of jurisdiction in such circumstances is reasonable. 69 In
the event the U.S. interest is greater, the U.S. party must make a
good faith effort to secure permission to comply with the
discovery order. 70 If the U.S. party cannot secure permission, it
may still be required to comply with the discovery order despite
the fact that it violates the law of another country. 7 1 This
doctrine has been limited to foreign laws that are not
substantive, 72 and courts have justified its potentially harsh
application by emphasizing the need for evidence and the
reluctance for U.S. courts to countenance the "suppression of
73

tnith."

E. Application of the Foreign CompulsionDefense to Title
Actions Arising Before ARAMCO

WI

Before the Supreme Court struck down the extraterritorial
application of Title VII in ARAMCO, 74 the EEOC and U.S. Courts
had several opportunities to consider the applicability of the
foreign compulsion defense to Title VII actions. In many respects,
the courts treated employment cases as they had dealt with cases
in the antitrust field. In Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine,75

67.

Hibbing, supranote 1,at 420.

68.

RESTATEMENT. supranote 58, § 442 reporter's notes 4 & 5.

69.
Hibbing, supra note 1, at 420. The analysis of the Interest of a foreign
state in regulating conduct in its own territory seems to run counter to the "act of
state doctrine." which "precludes inquiry into the validity of a foreign sovereign's
act and requires American courts to respect private claims based on the
contention that the damaging act of another country violates American law."
Mannington Mills. Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292-93 (3d. Cir.
1979). Like the presumption against extraterritoriality, the act of state doctrine Is
another device courts can use to avoid making foreign policy by deciding cases.
However, to the extent that the United States desires to apply U.S. law abroad,
with a foreign laws defense, the inquiry prohibited by the act of state doctrine is
central to any reasoned analysis of individual cases.
70.
RESTATEMENT, supranote 58, § 442 reporter's note 4 & 5.
71.
First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 903.
72.
RESTATEMENT, supranote 58, § 442, reporter's note 4 & 5.
73.
First Nat'il City Bank, 396 F.2d at 903.
74.
Boureslan v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
75.
805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986). See Bryant v. International Schools
Servs.. 502 F. Supp. 472, 490 (D.N.J. 1980) (rejecting a claim that the
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two Jewish medical school students sued Baylor after a
university policy denied them the chance to participate in a
school program based in Saudi Arabia. 76
Baylor claimed
protection under the foreign compulsion defense, alleging that
Saudi authorities would have prohibited the school from
employing Jewish students. 77 The court, however, found that
Baylor had established the discriminatory policy itself, based on
the assumption that Saudi authorities would not permit Jewish
students to participate, and that Baylor could not show sufficient
proof that it had in fact been compelled by Saudi authorities to
establish its discriminatory policy. 78 Absent proof of the foreign
government's actual compulsion, the defense could not stand.
Baylor's mere speculation concerning Saudi Arabia's laws was
not sufficient to mount a defense of foreign compulsion. 79
Rather, "the employer must have a current, authoritative, and
factual basis for its belief, and it must rely on that belief in good
faith."8 0 This requirement has created problems of proof for
defendants, who would obviously prefer to raise the defense
before they are actually subject to the foreign country's acts. On
occasion, U.S. courts have put defendants in a difficult position
by not accepting the statements of foreign officials concerning the
illegality of the act in the foreign forum. 8 1 In other words, in close
cases, this requirement could have the effect of forcing
defendants to actually suffer the foreign compulsion before they
can raise it as a defense.8 2

discriminatory payment of benefits was mandated by the Iranian government, and
finding that the discrimination arose from the company's own, voluntarily devised,
benefits policy).
76.
Abrams, 805 F.2d at 530.
77.
Id. at 533.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
EEOC Decision No. 85-10, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH] T6851 (July 16,
1985).
81.
See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1254 n.21 (7th
Cir. 1980) (rejecting amicus brief from the Canadian government as not
sufficiently probative on the issue of the foreign compulsion defense). The EEOC
could decide to take a more generous view of such statements than that taken by
the courts.
82.
The court's reluctance to accept the foreign sovereign's statement
appears to run afoul of the act of state doctrine. See supranotes 64 & 69. On the
other hand, merely accepting these statements uncritically provides foreign
officials with a strong incentive to lie, which could dramatically undercut
protection for U.S. plaintiffs.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MAHONEYDECISION
A. The Facts of Mahoney
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a non-profit
Delaware corporation known globally for its radio broadcast
service based in Munich, Germany.8 3 In 1982, RFE/RL entered a
collective bargaining agreement with a German labor union. 84
The agreement required all workers to retire at the age of sixtyfive, a standard provision of German labor agreements.8 5 At the
time the agreement was negotiated, the ADEA was held not to
apply extraterritorially. 8 6 But when Congress amended the act in
1984 to apply to U.S. companies hiring U.S. citizens abroad, 8 7
RFE/RL applied to the "Works Council" for an exception to the
agreement in order to comply with the ADEA and was denied. 8
RFE/RL appealed the Works Council decision to a Munich labor
court, which denied RFE/RL's claim on the grounds that to allow
U.S. workers to work past the age of sixty-five would discriminate
against similarly situated German workers, and that the labor
agreement itself prohibited U.S. citizens from working past the
age of sixty-five. 89 Pursuant to that ruling, RFE/RL terminated
Mr. Mahoney's employment when he reached the age of sixtyfive. 90 Mr. Mahoney's termination was a clear facial violation of
the ADEA, and RFE/RL did not contest that legal conclusion. 9 1
Mr. Mahoney brought suit against RFE/RL for violating the
ADEA, and prevailed in federal district court. 92 The decision,
however, was overtumed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. 9 3

83.
Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1992).
84
Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447. 448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).

85.

Id.

86.
See infra note 121.
87.
See Older Americans Act, Amendments of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-459, §
802(a), 98 Stat. 1767, 1792 (1984).
88.
Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 448.
German "Works Councils" consist of
representatives elected by workers to ensure that the company will adhere to
union contracts. Companies may not depart from the terms of a union contract
without securing approval from the Works Council. Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. It Is worth noting that RFE/RL claimed to have made a good faith
effort to renegotiate the contract with the German Works Council, but was
unsuccessful in this effort. The two courts took differing views on these efforts,
with the district court finding that RFE/RL could have made greater efforts to
obtain concessions from the union. Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 5.
91.
Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 448.
92.
Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 6.
93.
Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 451.
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Mr. Mahoney appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court,
94
but certiorari was denied.
B. The District CourtOpinion
The narrow issue addressed was whether the "foreign laws"
exception applies when a U.S. company operating overseas would
have to breach a collective bargaining agreement with a foreign
union in order to comply with the ADEA. The district court
determined that the meaning of "the laws of the country" must
turn on congressional intent. 95 The court cited no authority, but
found it "difficult to imagine" that Congress would have intended
"laws" to mean something beyond its normal meaning and to
include policies and general practices. 9 6 By the district court's
estimation, the term "laws" was intended to mean positive

legislation and nothing more. 97 To support this proposition, the
court noted that, on at least one occasion, Congress had taken
pains to distinguish between "laws" and the "policies and
practices" of foreign governments. 98 Since Congress has chosen
specifically to include "policies and practices" in past legislation,
but did not do so in the ADEA or Title VII, the court inferred that
Congress did not intend to include private or unofficial policies in
the word "laws."9 9 Consequently, the court interpreted the
phrase "laws" to include only the positive legislative laws of the
host country. 10 0 While the labor agreement in question differs
somewhat from U.S. private contracts, testimony at trial tended

94.

Mahoney v. RFE/RL. Inc., 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).

95.
There is little meaningful legislative history on congressional intent
regarding the foreign laws exception. Judge Posner described the history of the
amendment as leaving "totally obscure whether the amendment was meant to
change the law, to state more clearly the original meaning of the law, or perhaps
just to limit the extraterritorial application of the act." Pfeiffer v. William Wrigley
Co., 755 F.2d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 1985).
96.
Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 4.
97.
I The court never explicitly explains its reasoning, but repeatedly
emphasizes the word "laws" in italics, inferring perhaps that "laws" can only be
interpreted as referring to legislation. This assumption may or may not be valid.
Unlike the ADEA's exception, the exception in Title VII is phrased in terms of
"foreign law." So whatever etymological differences might exist between "law" and
"laws," those differences are irrelevant because there is no rational reason for
congressional intent to differ between the ADEA and Title VII.
98.
Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 4. The court's implicit logic, of course, is
that if Congress had taken pains in the past to specifically include "policies and
practices," in a situation where it could also have just said "laws," "laws" must
refer only to the law and not "policies and practices." Id.
99.
Id.
The labor agreement was never sanctioned or approved by the
legislature, but it differs from a private contract as understood in the United

States. See discussion infra part V.B.
100.

Id.
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to show that the contract differed from. legislation in that it was
not mandated by the German government, nor was it generally
applicable to parties not in privity.' 0 ' It certainly could not be
called "legislation" under anything but a strained meaning of the
term. Consequently, the district court found that the collective
bargaining agreement was fundamentally different from
legislation and did not rise to the

level of "foreign laws."' 0 2

Therefore, the existence of the collective bargaining agreement did
not exculpate RFE/RL from liability for its violation of the
03
ADEA.1
C. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The court of appeals overturned the district court decision,
ruling that the definition of the word "law" is governed by the
Supreme Court's pronouncement in Norfolk and Western Railway

v. American TrainDispatchers'Assn. 10 4 In that case, the Supreme
Court interpreted a statute that contained an exemption from "all
other law."10 5 Because the court found the "all other law"
provisions to be essentially identical to the foreign laws defense, it
held that the Norfolk and Western reasoning must control. 10 6 In
Norfolk and Western, the Supreme Court held that because a
contract "depends upon other laws" to enforce it, a breach of
contract violates the "law."' 0 7 Based upon this reasoning, the
court of appeals held that the meaning of "law" in the foreign laws
exception of the ADEA and Title VII was "clear and certain," and

101. IA at 3.
102. IL at 4.
103. Id.
104. Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 449 (applying Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v.
American Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 449 U.S. 117, 133 (1991)). The court's
decision to rely on Norfolk is problematic. A large body of law discusses the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law, and the foreign compulsion defense in
particular. The court based its decision on an entirely domestic case with dubious
precedential value in this field.
105. 49 U.S.C. § 11341(a) (1980). "A carrier, corporation, or person
participating in that approved or exempted transaction is exempt from the
antitrust laws and from all other law, including state and municipal law, as
necessary to let that person carry out the transaction, hold, maintain, and operate
property, and exercise control of franchises acquired through the transaction." Id.
This statute was designed to facilitate mergers in the railroad industry by
removing any and all legal obstacles to the transaction. The purpose for which
the word "laws" is construed in this statute is unrelated and irrelevant to the
needs of the foreign law defense.

106.

Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 450.

107.

Norfolk, 499 U.S. at 130.
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held that "law" included
the collective bargaining agreement
08

involving RFE/RL.1
Next, the court distinguished Mahoney and Norfolk and
Western from American Airlines v. Wolens, 10 9 in which the
Supreme Court held that, under a statutory provision exempting
parties from "any law," the word "law" did not encompass a
collective bargaining agreement. 10
The court distinguished
Norfolk and Western from American Airlines by finding that, if the
statute in American Airlines was interpreted to include collective
bargaining agreements, the statute as a whole would have been
meaningless or contradictory and would have failed of its
essential purpose. 1 11
Because a Norfolk and Western style
interpretation would not render the ADEA "senseless," the
12
American Airlines definition could not apply. 1
In closing, the court suggested that a deliberate attempt to
violate the ADEA under the cover of the foreign laws exception
would be treated differently, but that RFE/RL's conduct showed
no evidence of bad faith. 113 Nevertheless, this holding does not
give employees any more protection than they had before the
ADEA was amended to apply extraterritorialy. Even before the
ADEA was amended to apply abroad, a deliberate attempt to
evade the operation of the ADEA, by hiding behind the
presumption against extraterritorial application of the ADEA,
would have failed. 1 14
For instance, if an employer were to
transfer an employee overseas for the sole purpose of terminating
him outside the protection of the ADEA, courts would have been
inclined to overlook the presumption against extraterritoriality
and rule on the merits of the discrimination case. 115

108.
use of

Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 449. Strangely. the district court found that this
language would be "difficult to imagine" and not "clear and certain."

Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 4.
109.
115 S.Ct. 817 (1995).

110.

Id.at824

111.
Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 450.
112.
Id. The court devoted no more time to considering the policy concerns
of the foreign laws exception.
It is entirely possible that the interpretation
adopted by the court has made the extraterritorial application of the ADEA so
ineffectual as to be senseless.
113.
"There Is not, nor could there be. any suggestion that RFE/RL agreed
to the mandatory retirement provision in order to evade the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act" Mahoney, 47 F. 3d at 451.
114.
See Hearings. supra note 44, 2-7 (statement of Clarence Thomas,
Chairman, EEOC). Thomas, then head of the EEOC, explained that such a
pretense would not be sufficient to avoid the application of the ADEA, even before
its explicit application extraterritorially.
115. Id.
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D. Critique of Mahoney's-Reasoning

The court of appeals claimed to use the essential purpose of
the statutory schemes in question to construe the "other laws"
exceptions, but gave little or no consideration to the policy
objectives to be served by the ADEA or the foreign laws exception.

Rather, the court attempted to find a literal definition of the word
"laws" that would determine the scope of the foreign laws defense.
In doing so, the court perpetuates a legal fallacy-that descriptive
words have a fixed meaning, and that the meaning provides a
useful result whenever it is applied. In Grant v. McAuliffe, the
California Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Traynor,
held that a statute or other rule of law should be characterized
"according to the nature of the problem for which a
characterization must be made." 116 In Grant, the California
Supreme Court was faced with a conflicts problem, which was
ostensibly resolved by a black letter rule providing that a forum
court may apply its own "procedural" laws, whether or not Its
"substantive" law governed the matter at issue. 117 The court was
presented with a finding that the law in question had been
characterized as "procedural" in a previous case for the purpose
of determining whether or not the law was intended to apply
retroactively." 8 The court held that the previous decision was
irrelevant to the issue of conflicts because it addressed
fundamentally different policy questions. 119 Similarly, the fact
that collective bargaining agreements had been characterized as
"laws" in some previous domestic action is irrelevant to the issue
of whether collective bargaining agreements should be considered
"laws" for the purposes of the foreign laws exception. The court,
however, made no attempt to address the underlying policy
concerns, beyond its conclusory statement, and thus did not
consider which interpretation addressed the implicated policy
questions most adequately.

V.

INTERESTS AT WORK IN MAHONEY

The next section discusses the nature and extent of the
competing interests at work in Mahoney, which will serve as a
basis for analyzing the various proposed interpretations of the
ADEA and Title VII's foreign laws defense. In the absence of
international agreements that could resolve these difficulties, this

117.

264 P.2d 944, 948 (Cal. 1953).
I.

118.
119.

Id.
Id.

116.
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tangle of interests is best served by some variant of the traditional
foreign compulsion defense adopted by the district court, and not
the definition of foreign "law" advanced in Mahoney.
A. ForeignCompulsion in Mahoney

One must consider the nature of compulsion potentially
faced by RFE/RL, had it been forced to comply with the ADEA.
For the purposes of this statutory provision, compulsion can
come in three ways: official governmental compulsion, unofficial
governmental compulsion, and private compulsion. Beginning in
1982, RFE/RL hired its employees under the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement it had negotiated with labor unions in
Munich.12 0 The agreement set a mandatory retirement age of
sixty-five years.12 1 When the ADEA was amended to apply
extraterritorially, RFE/RL was willing to comply with its
provisions and applied to the "Works Council" for an exception to
the terms of the agreement. 12 2 The Works Council refused the
exception. 123 RFE/RL appealed to a German labor court, which
refused to allow RFE/RL to deviate from the contract on the
grounds it would discriminate against German workers. 124
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that to require
RFE/RL to comply with the ADEA would cause the company to
"violat[e] the German laws standing behind such contracts, as
well as the decisions of the Munich Labor Court." 125 In doing so,
the court found that the German court's order represented the
sort of official, governmental compulsion contemplated in the
foreign laws defense-a binding order of a foreign sovereign. 126 In

120. Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 448
121. Id. Of course, when the agreement was signed in 1982, it was perfectly
legal because the ADEA had been held not to apply extraterritorially.
122. The Works Council is a body elected by unionized and non-unionzed
employees. Its duty is to ensure that management does not depart from union
contracts, and it has sole authority to allow departures from contractual
requirements. Mahoney, 47 F.3d 447. 448.
123. Id.

124. Id. Requiring such nondiscriminatory national treatment is potentially
a useful defense for employers.
If the host country had a law banning
discrimination on the basis of nationality, then an employer would violate that law
if it negotiated a unilateral change for U.S. workers abroad and did not change the
policy for foreign workers. In other words, the presence of one U.S. employee
could infect the entire workforce, or the corporation could face discrimination
charges from the host country. It seems unlikely that this is the result Congress
sought, as it hoped to regulate conditions for U.S. citizens only. See supra note
25. Hence, a simple anti-discrimination statute in the host country could pose an
interesting obstacle to the extraterritorial application of U.S. employment statutes
which protect U.S. citizens abroad.

125.
126.

Id. at 450.
I& at 448.
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contrast, the district court understood the compulsion to arise
from the terms of the private agreement itself, and not the Works
Council or labor court's interpretation of that agreement. 12 7 In
other words, the decision of the German court did not represent a
statement of German employment policy, but was a mechanistic
act construing and enforcing the terms of a private agreement.
Implicitly, the district court held that RFE/RL was under a duty
to renegotiate the terms of the private agreement it had entered,
and thus remove the grounds for any official compulsion in the
form of a court order. The court also found that RFE/RL's
128
attempts to renegotiate had been half-hearted at best.
Essentially, the district court held that the potential difficulty of
renegotiating a private contract did not represent the sort of
compulsion worthy to defeat the action of U.S. law. In contrast,
the court of appeals saw the decision of the German labor court
as an explicit form of public or governmental compulsion meriting
respect under the foreign laws defense. As the law stands, the
line between the public and private domains must be carefully
drawn to advance important U.S. interests abroad, while at the
same time ensuring that U.S. law does not intrude into the
legislative and regulatory realm of the host country.
B. Ways in Which the Works Council and the CBA areLike
"Legislation"

It has been observed that in European countries governed by
a civil code, the impact and effect of employment laws and
obligations should be "fairly easy to ascertain." 12 9 Nonetheless,
both courts in Mahoney struggled to discern the true nature of

127. Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1. 3 (D.D.C. 1992). The court
explained, "Those decisions simply held that the union contract did not permit a
retirement age higher than 65; they merely enforced the contract upon the parties
to it.... They did not hold that anything in German law compelled the decisions
reached." Id.
128. Id. "It is clear from the undisputed facts, however, that it could have
done more to come into compliance. Most important, the defendant did not fully
pursue the possibility of achieving an actual change In the union contract." Id. at
5. "The defendant is essentially arguing that the German unions simply will not
allow it to eliminate the mandatory retirement policy. But the United States
Congress will not allow it to retain the policy. Of the two, only Congress makes
law." Id. at 5-6. In contrast, the court of appeals was not interested in RFE/RL's
efforts to renegotiate the contract, noting only that "RFE/RL negotiated with the
unions to delete the mandatory retirement provision from the collective bargaining
agreement, but to no avail." Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 448.
129. Smith, supra note 62, at 208. In fact, the true nature of German labor

law has confounded every U.S. court confronted with it.
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the collective bargaining obligation. 130 There are two distinct
components of a German collective bargaining agreement: an
"obligatory" part and a "normative" part. 13 1 "The obligatory part
deals with the rights and duties of the parties of the collective
agreement, [and] the normative part regulates the working
conditions... and questions relating to the establishment and its
legal structure." 132 With respect to the normative part of the
agreement, "the parties of the collective agreement act as if they
were a legislator" in that the terms they draft must be adhered to
as statutes. 13 3 The obligatory part binds only the parties in

privity to the agreement-i.e., members of the union and the
company-while the normative part of the agreement regulates
working conditions in the company for union and non-union
employees. 134 Normative provisions are treated as having the
same binding effect as law. Moreover, these agreements are
typically not made between individual companies and individual
unions as in the United States, but are usually negotiated
between unions and regional or nationwide
employer
associations.13 5
Consequently, German collective bargaining
agreements can govern the relationships of thousands of workers
and companies in German states or even nationwide.13 6 Given
the binding force of their provisions and their broad application,
German collective bargaining agreements possess qualities
similar to legislation.
Nonetheless, the agreement is
fundamentally different from legislation or regulation in that its

130.

For an amusing recount of dialogue at the trial court, where counsel

for both parties interpret the expert witness' testimony under questioning from
the judge, see Street. supra note 8, at 17.
131.

MANFRED WEISS, LABOUR LAV AND INDUSTRIAL RELAnONS IN THE FEDERAL

REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 124-25 (1987).
132. Id. In other words, the obligatory part of the agreement binds only
union employees and the employer, while the normative part of the agreement

sets standards for all employees in the workplace, even those not in the union.

Using this logic, the retirement provision in Mahoney would be classified as
normative because it applied to Mr. Mahoney even though he was not in the
union.
133.
Id. The German labor court upheld the age limit "mainly on the

grounds that the constitutionally guaranteed right of unions and employers to
determine employment conditions . . . entitled them to establish rules on the
termination of the individual employment relationship for age reasons and to
expect that these would be respected in exactly the way statutory provisions must
be complied with." Spiros Simitis, DenationalizingLabour Law: The Case of Age
Discu"mination,15 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 321, 322 (1994).
134. WEISS, supra note 131, at 124.
135.
Id.
136.
Id.

402

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 30:379

terms are not mandated by the German government at any
37
level.1
C. The German Government's Interest in Early Retirement

In considering the application of a foreign laws defense to
U.S. employment law, courts should consider the interests of the
foreign sovereign in regulating.its labor markets. These Interests
may be expressed either as formal legislation, or as informal rules
or practices that nonetheless have a significant influence on
employment decisions. 138 In this case, the German government
has not promulgated any laws requiring a retirement age of sixtyfive years. 139 but it has expressed an interest in promoting early
retirement by enacting legislation to facilitate early retirement
programs.' 40 The purpose of these regulations, and many other
German labor regulations, is to reduce levels of unemployment by
encouraging early retirement and the weekly number of hours
worked. 14 1 German policymakers have traditionally viewed early
retirement programs as an acceptable and necessary labor
market regulation, and not as invidious discrimination.' 4 2 There
is some evidence, however, that Europe is becoming increasingly
aware of the evils of age discrimination, and may soon begin to
protect older citizens with legislation like the ADEA.143 Whatever

137. U.S. collective bargaining agreements possess some of these same
qualities. Their terms may govern the working of tens of thousands of employees,
and although the union may negotiate the contract terms, those provisions, such
as working conditions, may be applicable to non-union workers in the company.
Moreover, the contracts embody a number of policies that the government might
support, similar to the retirement age provision in Mahoney, but which the
government does not mandate.
See supranote 126.
138.
139.
See Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 5.
See WEISS, supranote 131, at 80. The Act of April 1984 on Facilitating
140.
Early Retirement was designed to encourage early retirement by partially
subsidizing retirement benefits until the worker reaches the statutory age to
receive benefits from the social insurance system. Id.
Id. German unemployment has been over 10% since the early 1990s.
141.
John Templman & Bill Javetski, Kohl's Ax is Really Aimed at Europe: Will his

Reform Ideas Spread?, Bus. WK., May 27, 1996, at 52, avalabe in 1996 WL

761466. In limited circumstances, some German companies have opted for a fourday work week to increase employment levels. Brandon Mitchener. Europe's Car
Makers PredictDismal 1996, WALL ST. J.. Jan. 18, 1996, at A10. See WEISS, supra
note 131, at 80.
Simitis, supranote 133, at 338.
142.
G-7 Nations Meet in Detroit to Discuss the Unemployment Criss and
143.
Ways to Resolve it, WK. IN GERMANY, Mar. 18, 1994, available in 1994 WL
2220131. There are signs that the tide Is turning, and early retirement programs
are seen as less acceptable today than in the recent past. German Labor Minister
Norbert Bleum "cautioned against solving the unemployment crisis through the
introduction of early retirement programs," which are used as an "easy answer" to
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interest the German government may have in promoting a policy
of early retirement, there is no evidence that the application of
the ADEA to Germany was viewed with hostility or suspicion.
Although there was no explicit mention of German government

consternation in Mahoney, other U.S. courts in a similar context
found it "noteworthy that neither the Department of State nor the
German Government . . . expressed any view on [the] case or

indicated that, under the circumstances present [in the case],
enforcement of the subpoena would violate German public policy
or embarrass German-American relations." 14 4 Likewise, whatever
pressures RFE/RL may have felt in complying with the ADEA
would not have come from the German government.
D. The Difficulty of Renegotiating the Collective Bargaining

Agreement
Notwithstanding the earlier discussion of the insignificance of
private compulsion to the foreign compulsion defense, it is
important to consider the potential burden on U.S. employers
working abroad. Any legal interpretation that places undue
burdens on employers and hinders international trade, while
doing little to combat discrimination, must be reconsidered. This
section examines the difficulties RFE/RL would have faced if it
had been forced to comply with the ADEA.
If the district court's decision were to have been upheld in
Mahoney, RFE/RL would have been forced to address the root of
its discrimination-the collective bargaining agreement. At trial,
RFE/RL claimed that it had been unable to negotiate a change in
the contract before the suit, and that continued efforts would
have been futile. 145 The district court rejected this argument,
finding that RFE/RL had not "pursue[d] serious negotiations with
the unions on the issue." 146 By contrast, the court of appeals
was more impressed with RFE/RL's good faith efforts to comply
with the ADEA, or at least its absence of bad faith. The court
noted, "There is not, nor could there be, any suggestion that
RFE/RL agreed to the mandatory retirement provision in order to

unemployment. Id. See also Simitis, supra note 133, at 338 (arguing that "Just as
it took European laws a number of years to follow the example of the United
States in the case of sex discrimination, it is only a matter of time until a change
of attitude to the treatment of older people emerges under the impact of
reflections comparable to those underlying the ADEA."); Richard Worsley, Letter to
the Editor. TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 24. 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Txtne File (mentioning the greater attention paid to age discrimination recently in
the United Kingdom).
144. U.S. v. First Nat. City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 904 (2d Cir. 1968).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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evade the Age Discrimination in Employment Act." 147 If RFE/RL
was forced to attempt more serious negotiations, it would have
encountered
several structural
impediments
to gaining
concessions, stemming from the nature of German labor
agreements. As discussed earlier, German collective bargaining
agreements are typically negotiated between labor unions and
148
industry associations that cover large parts of Germany.
Consequently,
the contracts
drafted rarely reflect
the
circumstances of individual companies. 14 9 As a result, U.S.
employers in Germany, when seeking to renegotiate a contract,
might be forced to alter an agreement that governs tens of
thousands of German employees to protect the rights of only a
few U.S. citizens. Second, because the contracts govern the
relationships of many workers and companies, collective
bargaining negotiations are frequently politicized and subject to
intense public scrutiny. 150 A U.S. company might be viewed
unfavorably for attempting to negotiate privileges for its U.S.
employees that it denies to others.
Given the institutional
barriers and public pressures, it is fair to say that an individual
U.S. company might pay a substantial price to realize a change in
the agreement.

VI.

SUGGESTED INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FOREIGN LAWS EXCEPTION
AND APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF MAHONEY

A. Application of the TraditionalForeignCompulsion Defense to the
Facts of Mahoney
Several commentators initially thought that the foreign laws

defense was intended to be a codification of the foreign
compulsion defense.
Mahoney suggests otherwise.
German
collective bargaining agreements serve an important public
purpose, have widespread application (unlike typical U.S.
contracts), and have the effect and enforceability of some U.S.
statutes. Nonetheless, the labor agreements were not mandated

147. Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 451. For those who seek to distinguish Mahoney
from later cases, the collective bargaining agreement was negotiated before the
ADEA was amended to cover it. Consequently, the violation of the ADEA can be
portrayed as inadvertent, notwithstanding RFE/RL's failure to renegotiate the
agreement after the statute was amended. In the case of agreements made after
the statute was amended, it will be harder to show that the failure was
inadvertent and in good faith.
148. WEISS, supranote 128, at 120.
149. Id.
150
I&
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by any German legislature at any level.15 1 The Works Council did
not have the unilateral power to declare the law. Rather, it could
make binding decisions concerning private, voluntarily entered,
labor agreements. Without a formal law or regulation from the
German government, this contract simply does not constitute the
sort of formal, policy-based compulsion required by the foreign
compulsion defense. In considering a somewhat similar case, in
which a U.S. company had entered into an anti-competitive
agreement with several Swiss watchmakers, the court held the
following:
[Diefendant's activities were not required by the laws

of

Switzerland. They were agreements formulated privately without
compulsion on the part of the Swiss Government. It Is clear that
these private agreements were then recognized as facts of economic
and industrial life by that nation's government. Nonetheless. the
fact that the Siss Government may, as a practical matter, approve

of the effects of this private activity cannot convert what is
essentially a vulnerable private conspiracy into an unassailable
system resulting from foreign governmental mandate. 152

The offered defense failed despite the widespread use of anticompetitive contracts and the Swiss public policy they
undoubtedly served.
In this regard, the traditional foreign
compulsion defense does allow U.S. law to interfere concerning a
foreign sovereign's regulation of its labor markets.
The requirement of a binding law or regulation has also been
criticized for its potential to subject U.S. corporations working
abroad to substantial unofficial government pressures. 153
Commentators observe that the distinction made in the foreign
compulsion defense between public and private compulsion is not
as clear abroad as it is in the United States. 15 4 In Mahoney, for
instance, it is not entirely clear to what extent the German
government has mandated the requirement age of sixty-five years
through its programs facilitating early retirement. 15
This
confusion results even in Germany, a civil law country, where the
distinctions between public and private compulsion are similar to6
5
the United States and should be relatively easy to ascertain.
Therefore, it has been argued that U.S. corporations may be

151.
Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 5.
152.
U.S. v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr., Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH)
170,600, at 77, 456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).

153. Smith, supra note 62, at 212 (citing the Gbi in Japan and traditional
Muslim law as cultural factors that-while not government ordained--play a very
influential role in how an American company operating overseas must conduct its
employment practices").
154. Id. at 212-13.
155.
See supranote 140 and accompanying text.
156.
See supratext accompanying note 151.
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genuinely subject to foreign governmental compulsion that Is not
expressed in the form of legislation, but which does not fall within
the narrowly defined foreign compulsion defense.' 5 7 This plea of
hardship by the employer must be considered in light of larger
policy aims. The presumption against extraterritoriality, the past
application of the foreign compulsion defense, and the aims of the
ADEA and Title VII have not been shaped to alleviate the potential
of hardship to an employer.' 5 8 While the foreign compulsion
defense fails to address the possibility of non-legislative foreign
government compulsion, that shortcoming is not a fatal flaw.
First, the foreign compulsion defense offers an easy solution
for any nation that feels its nonlegislative policies are being
frustrated by the operation of U.S. employment law-it can

simply pass a "blocking statute" such as those enacted to fight

the application of U.S. discovery laws.' 5 9 However, unlike the
statutes discussed above, employment statutes would likely be
more respected as a substantive law governing an important
domestic interest. 160 This view would bring the U.S. employer
under the protection of the statute and exculpate it from liability
under the ADEA or Title VII. While this solution may sound farfetched, it is supported by the rapid proliferation of similar
blocking statutes in other areas of the law.16 1 Assuming a case in
which a foreign sovereign was concerned enough to impose
punitive sanctions on a U.S. company, it seems reasonable that,
given the option, the foreign country would accept the invitation
to block the extraterritorial application of U.S. law with an easily
drafted statute. 162

More importantly, in the event of a potential conflict with a
foreign government, the EEOC typically consults with the
Department of State to ensure that there is no chance of creating
foreign relations problems.16 3 There is little danger that a foreign
nation would fail to express its displeasure with the
extraterritorial application of U.S. employment law, 164 and the

157. See supra note 126.
158. See supra Parts III.A. III.C and III.B respectively.
159. See RESTATEMENT, supranote 58. § 442, reporter's notes 4 & 5.
160. See supratext accompanying notes 67-73 (discussing the willingness of
U.S. courts to require cooperation with discovery orders despite the existence of
foreign blocking statutes).
161. RESTATEMENT, supranote 58, § 442 reporter's note 4.
162. For a collection of blocking statutes, see A.V. Lows, EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION 79-143 (1983),

163.

ZIMMERMAN, supranote 26, at 135.

164. See David J. Gerber,
the Reach of National Laws. 10
antitrust laws, even traditional
application of U.S. law abroad.

Beyond Balancing: InternationalLaw Restraints on
YALE J. INT'L L. 185, 188 (1984). In the field of
allies such as Great Britain have protested the
There is little doubt that foreign nations would

voice their concerns on an even more domestic field of law.
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EEOC would have the discretion to decide whether it should
accept the statements of foreign officials as probative on the issue
of foreign compulsion. 165 By not pursuing actions that threaten
to create foreign relations difficulties, the EEOC could protect the
interests of U.S. employers that would otherwise be subject to
foreign sanctions.
However, the traditional application of the foreign
compulsion defense makes no concession for the interests of the
U.S. employer subject to private compulsion, no matter how
strongly they are expressed. In Mahoney, RFE/RL might have
been subject to a lengthy and embarrassing negotiation process
66
in order to secure a contract in compliance with the ADEA.'
While private compulsion may create hardships, it has been
observed that cultural norms or instances of private
discrimination are difficult to quantify or document, and lend
themselves more readily to exaggeration and pretextual claims by
U.S. employers. 16 7 In the realm of international business, there
are probably few barriers that cannot be breached through
bargaining or consideration. Further, the foreign compulsion
defense, the presumption against extraterritoriality, and U.S.
anti-discrimination
legislation give little weight to the
inconveniences that a U.S. corporation abroad would face in
dealing with private discrimination.
B. ReasonablenessApproach

Before the amendments to Title VII, some commentators
suggested that any conflicts of law could be addressed through
what is called a "comity analysis." 168 Under the Restatement
version of this analysis, a reviewing court may consider a laundry
list of factors in determining whether extraterritorial application
of a law is reasonable. The factors include: (1) the interest of the
foreign state in regulating the activity in question; 1 69 (2) the
character of the activity to be regulated; (3) the importance of the
activity to the regulating state; (4) the extent to which other states

165. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 142-47.
167. Hibbing. supra note 1. at 429-30. In discussing a case in which a U.S.
company turned down a female applicant for a position in an Arab country, the
speaker referred to a picture in National Geographic of a veiled Bedouin woman
driving a water truck, contrary to the company's allegation that women in Saudi
Arabia are not allowed to drive. This simply illustrates that the cultural norms
cited may not be as pervasive or universal as they may first appear, or as a
defendant may suggest, and may not be sufficiently potent to justify a
discriminatory hiring practice.
168. I& at 420.
169. RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 403(3).
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regulate such activity; 170 and (5) the links between the state

seeking to exercise jurisdiction and the parties to the conflict. 17 1
U.S. courts that have applied a comity analysis have also
considered the potential for hardship on the plaintiff. 17 2 Under
the comity analysis, the U.S. court should decline jurisdiction if
the interest of the foreign'state is clearly greater. 173
While the reasonableness approach seems sensible at first
glance, it provides courts little guidance and can be adapted to
serve almost any purpose. Before the ADEA was amended to
apply extraterritorially, one commentator argued that the
balancing approach could be a useful way to justify the broad
application of U.S. jurisdiction over U.S. citizens working
abroad.174 It was argued that the reasonableness test can often
justify the application of U.S. law to prevent discrimination, even
in the face of a conflicting foreign employment law. 17 5 On the
other hand, after the amendments to Title VII, which applied the
statute extraterritorially (limited by the foreign laws defense),
another commentator suggested that the application of the
Restatement's reasonableness test could alleviate the potentially
harsh effects of the foreign laws defense, which was presumed at
the time to be a codification of the rather limited foreign
compulsion defense. 176 The fact that the test leads, apparently
reasonably, to such diverse results indicates its elasticity and
lack of utility. Further, the sort of decisionmaking required by
the reasonableness standard resembles the formulation of foreign
policy, which prompted the presumptions and defenses in the
first place. 177 This was exactly the sort of controversy that courts

170. Id. § 403(2)(c).
171. Id. § 403(2)(b).
172. See TInberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d
597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976).
173. RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 403(3). U.S. courts are quite familiar
with comity-style balancing tests, as it is frequently the method used to resolve
"choice of law" issues involving conflicting state law. U.S. choice of law rules have
evolved from a black letter system, which used legal standards such as lex loci
delicti (the law of the place of the wrong) in a much more sophisticated analysis of
each state's interest in having its law applied to resolve the dispute. See In re Air
Crash Disaster. 86 F.3d 498, 542 n.26 (6th Cir. 1996). In cases Involving the
extraterritorial application of the ADEA or Title VII, the court will be faced with a
U.S. plaintiff pleading the protection of U.S. law opposed by a U.S. defendant
pleading the compulsion of its host country and invoking the host country's
interest in regulating its domestic workplaces.
174. See Debra L.W. Cohn, Note, Equal Employment Opportunity for
AmericansAbroad, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1288, 1316-24 (1987).
175. See id.
at 1316.
176. See Mary Claire St. John, Note. ExtraterritorialApplication of Title V1I:
The ForeignCompulsion Defense and Principlesof IntemationalComity. 27 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 869, 892-94 (1994).
177. See id. at 889.
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prefer to avoid. With the EEOC and the State Department acting
as a filter for actions that threaten to create diplomatic
confrontations, courts would rarely have any need to engage in
the balancing test or policy analysis discussed. 178
The reasonableness test is difficult to apply to extraterritorial
employment discrimination cases because the competing
interests are so powerful. These interests include the powerful
remedial impulse of U.S. anti-discrimination legislation, the
undeniable interest of foreign countries in regulating their own
labor markets, and the strong desire of courts to avoid
international disputes.
One U.S. court that considered the
possibility of applying the reasonableness test declined the
opportunity, citing the difficulty of balancing such interests fairly,
as well as the tendency for courts to favor U.S. interests and to
apply the law extraterritorially. 179 This tendency is supported by

"the fact that balancing tests almost invariably yield the same
result: jurisdiction lies." 180 Consequently, the reasonableness or
balancing test would probably fail to promote comity or protect
U.S. employers significantly more than the foreign compulsion
defense, while abandoning the relative predictability of the
defense.
C. The Mahoney Standard
By defining the term "law" to include the requirements of a
collective bargaining agreement, the Mahoney decision protects
RFE/RL from liability where it would likely have been subject to
damages under either a foreign compulsion or reasonableness
analysis. In effect, the Mahoney decision has elevated speculative
private compulsion-RFE/RL's
anticipated difficulties
in
renegotiating the collective bargaining agreement-to the level of
official foreign governmental compulsion. To the extent that
Mahoney protects U.S. employers from the travails of private
foreign compulsion, the decision favors an interest that has
consistently been given low priority by the courts in construing

178. This is not to suggest that the EEOC would have untrammelled
discretion in these actions, but only that the EEOC's finding would be entitled to
the same deference that other administrative decisions enjoy.
179. See Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines. 731 F.2d 909,
948 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
180. Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction,98 HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1325 (1985). Since 1909, "not
a single United States appellate court has found jurisdiction wanting in a reported
extraterritorial antitrust case." Id. In addition, foreign interests rarely receive
anything more than a "perfunctory nod" from U.S. courts. Id. at 1324-25. On the
other hand, the foreign forum's interests in regulating its workplaces are
undoubtedly much stronger than in the antitrust arena.
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the foreign compulsion defense, the ADEA and Title VII, and the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
The decision also sacrifices the powerful national Interest In
preventing discrimination in the extraterritorial workplace. Since
many workplace policies are delineated in contract, and the
Mahoney standard requires corporations to neither breach the
contract to comply with the ADEA nor negotiate a nondiscriminatory contract, the Mahoney decision seems to allow
U.S. employers simply to contract out of the terms of the ADEA.
The court clearly stated that an employer's efforts, or the lack
thereof, to negotiate a non-discriminatory contract were irrelevant
to the defense.181
A company does not have to plead
impossibility or impracticability to succeed in its defense. The
company only needs to show the existence of the binding
contract, and possibly the absence of bad faith, to succeed In its
defense.
This standard also has the unfortunate effect of
encouraging foreign private parties, opposed to fair employment
practices, to adopt an unreasonable stance in negotiations. If the
foreign party is aware that its unreasonableness can essentially
force the U.S. corporation to contract out of the employment law,
it has no incentive to bargain otherwise.
As compared with the traditional foreign compulsion
doctrine, the Mahoney standard does not avoid international
conflicts pragmatically, which was the policy goal that drove the
presumption against extraterritoriality and the foreign
compulsion defense.
In this particular case, the German
government had expressed no opinion on the controversy, and it
does not appear that deciding to force RFE/RL to comply with the
ADEA would have implicated any delicate foreign policy
matters. 8 2 Relations between the United States and Germany
are friendly, and the provision in question, a national practice of
early retirement, is certainly less controversial than the vast
majority of social and political practices that a court would expect
to encounter in the extraterritorial application of U.S.
employment law. 18 3 In short, there was no legitimate foreign
policy reason to restrict the application of the ADEA in this case.
The only reason to exclude RFE/RL from the application of the
ADEA may be to prevent inconvenience to the employer.
The Mahoney decision sets a troubling precedent for future
extraterritorial application of the ADEA and Title VII. It threatens
to significantly undermine the remedial scope of U.S. employment
law without significantly advancing any interest that has
historically been valued in this field of law. More importantly,
181.
182.
183.

Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 451.
Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 6.
See Smith, supranote 62, at 212.

19971

DISCRIMINATION AND THE FOREIGNLAWS DEFENSE

411

Mahoney seems to be motivated by the historic and well-founded
reluctance of U.S. courts to involve themselves in international
disputes or to make foreign policy. Although Congress may have
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality in the ADEA
and Title VII, the fact remains that "whenever the United States
attempts to apply its labor policy within the territory of another
sovereign, conflicts will arise." 184 Such reality, combined with the
courts' reluctance to become involved in
international
controversy, seems to be the key factor in Mahoney.

VII. CONCLUSION
The court's ruling in Mahoney stems from the fact that, in
hastily amending Title VII and the ADEA to
apply
extraterritorially, Congress has effectively required courts to
make foreign policy decisions, with the attendant risks of
international conflict and the threat of trampling on the executive
branch's prerogative to make foreign policy. Of the approaches
discussed above, the traditional foreign compulsion defense
appears to balance existing policy concerns most effectively, and
should advance non-discrimination policies without the excessive

risks of international conflict. Nonetheless, courts would still be
required to make decisions that create foreign policy. Worse yet,
in a case like Mahoney, litigation may center around a private
dispute that involves two private parties, which may lead to a
resolution with public implications, and could place the United
185
States at odds with a foreign country.
The ideal solution to this problem would require the
executive branch to evaluate the foreign policy risks involved at
an early stage and to determine whether the risks of conflict are
sufficient to justify an exception from U.S. employment law.
Such involvement by the executive would relieve courts of the
sole responsibility for making policy decisions in this field and
mark any suit with the inprimatur of the executive branch. In
addition, it would eliminate a court's fear of treading on the
executive branch's dominion over foreign policy, given that the

184. Barella. supra note 27. at 919.
185. Indeed, employment questions similar to these are addressed in treaty
provisions, such as the U.S.-Japan treaty governing the application of U.S.
employment law to Japanese companies operating in the United States. See
Papaila v. Uniden Am. Corp.. 51 F.3d 54, 55-56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct.
187 (1995) (holding that the discriminatory hiring practices of a Japanese
subsidiary corporation operating in the United States were permitted by the U.S.Japan Treaty of Friendship. Commerce, and Navigation, which permits high-level
positions to be allocated in what would otherwise be allocated in an illegal
manner).
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suit will have been initiated by that branch. As it happens, there
is an institutional framework in place that could easily perform
this screening function. The EEOC is already responsible for
reviewing employee complaints and for issuing a letter of "right to
sue."186 Under current law, it is essentially immaterial whether
the EEOC issues the letter of right to sue, since a plaintiff can
proceed individually without the letter. 18 7 Amidst delicate Issues
of policy, Congress should require individual plaintiffs to bring
their claims through the EEOC, and not allow individuals the
right to bring an action without approval from the EEOC.
Consequently, any suit would have the implicit approval of the
executive branch and would remove the sources of apprehension
for courts in this area. If the executive branch were to make the
policy decision to pursue the suit and weather any consequences,
courts would be free to perform their function-to declare what
the law is-and apply the foreign laws exception as it was
intended, and not as a means to avoid making foreign policy. 188
Thomas Wang*

186. See Michael Selmi. The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's
Role in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 57 OHIO. Sr. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1996) (noting
that while the EEOC is already overburdened, the international context seems an
especially appropriate forum for agency intervention and the beneficial use of
such resources).
187. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S. 792. 798-99 (1973).
Congress could override this rule and require that all extraterritorial claims be
brought through the EEOC, with the advice of the State Department. Such action
would ensure that private claims do not create diplomatic incidents and would
free courts to perform the necessary judicial analysis.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35. In the domestic context,
few would accept the notion that courts simply discover the law, but would assert
that courts make policy decisions in deciding cases. In the International context,
however, courts seem more comfortable when clear guidance from the legislative
branch exists.
*The author is grateful for the support of his confidant and best friend. Colleen
Savoie, and for his friends at Vanderbilt, who have made law school a more
interesting and humane experience than It has any right to be, and of course to
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